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This is a pre-proof version of the article that was published as: Gorringe, H 2008: ‘The 
Caste of the Nation: Untouchability and Citizenship in South India’. Contributions to 
Indian Sociology 42(1): pp123-49 
The Caste of the Nation: Untouchability and Citizenship in South India 
 
Abstract: Following the devastating tsunami that ravaged parts of the South 
Indian coast on Boxing Day 2004, there were reports of continuing caste 
discrimination against India’s Scheduled Caste (Dalit) community. The 
reported absence of common feeling shattered the image of India as an 
‘imagined community’. Taking its cue from Aloysius, Nigam and Chatterjee, this 
paper draws on field-notes and archival reports to examine the ongoing and 
contested processes of nation and national identity formation in India. It is 
argued that the template against which the postcolonial state imagined the 
Indian ‘nation’ was one that excluded marginalised sections of the population. 
The paper concludes by asking whether India may be seen as a ‘national-state’ 
and critically analysing the interplay between caste and nation. 
Key Words: Caste, Nation, Untouchability, Nation Formation 
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The Caste of the Nation: Untouchability and Citizenship in South India 
 
Nagapattinam, January 6: There’s something even an earthquake measuring 9 on the 
Richter scale and a tsunami that kills over 1 lakh people can’t crack: the walls 
between caste (Sreenivas 2005). 
When the cheris rise, the nation will be turned on its head (DPI Slogan). 
Introduction 
On December 26th 2004 a tidal wave, triggered by a distant earthquake, caused widespread 
death and destruction in Asia, including the coast of the South Indian state of Tamilnadu. The 
tsunami prompted a global outpouring of grief and solidarity. There were countless stories of 
heroism, altruism and public spiritedness as volunteers rushed to aid the injured and bring 
what succour they could to a devastated region. Within weeks, however, reports suggested 
that the unity forged in crisis had distinct social and cultural limits. There were accounts of 
‘untouchables’ being forced out of relief camps (Husain 2005), denied relief provisions 
(Reynalds 2005), and of being too scared to approach government shelters (Indian NGOs 
2005). Reports from the ground suggested that relief was directed towards fisher-folk who 
were the most obvious victims of the disaster, bypassing Dalit communities whose land had 
been salinated and crops destroyed (Wielenga personal communication). Furthermore, 
according to the Chairman of the All India Confederation of SC/ST Organisations1: 
 
The government initiated separate camps for Dalits and others. Is this the spirit 
of the Constitution which says that the state will not practice any kind of 
discrimination on the basis of caste, creed, sex and race? (Raj 2005). 
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If nationals require a sense of fellow feeling, shared public culture and mutual commitment 
(Smith 1995), their absence here raises troublesome questions about the Indian ‘nation’ and 
echoes the colonialists and reformers of the late 19th and early 20th century who asserted that 
“caste is opposed to nationality” (Dirks 2001: 231). The overwhelming diversity of India has 
led Nigam (2006: 176) to “argue that the very project of Indian nationalism was an 
impossible one … because it was impossible to have one common history”. As he notes, and 
the above examples illustrate, the difficulties attending the location of a common past have 
ramifications for contemporary Indian citizens. Addressing the longevity of India, Tonnesson 
(2004: 181) extends the notion of a ‘national’ state to include those “‘plural states’ … [that] 
have managed to create a strong national sentiment among their citizens”.  
 
Such arguments, however, privilege the ‘nation’ as a homogenous entity, and the “the focus 
on national integration tends to gloss over the complex processes of transition and social 
change involved in national formation” (Hasan 1989: 21). Writing against the grain of 
homogenising nationalist projects, by contrast, Nigam displaces this prevalent focus to chart 
‘the insurrection of little selves’ that “contest or disturb given ideas of nationhood” (2006: 
20, original emphasis). Given continuing marginalisation of Dalits (ex-Untouchables), this 
paper will explore the interplay between caste, the state and national identity in India. It 
begins with an examination of nationalism and nation formation in India before considering 
ethnographic data. We will assess the extent to which a sense of unity and nationhood has 
supplanted more ‘parochial’ caste loyalties, and conclude by considering the implications of 
these findings. 
 
Derivative or Diverse? 
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Following Goswami’s (2004: 4) persuasive rejection of ‘methodological nationalism’ - 
whereby scholars presuppose the existence of a bounded national entity and neglect the 
complex and contingent processes that produce the conditions for the nation - it is important 
to begin with an understanding of the processes of nation-formation and an interrogation of 
nationalist historiography. The temptations of methodological nationalism are acute in a 
context where nationalism was heralded as the uprising of an oppressed ‘people’ against their 
colonial oppressors. Of course, this facile reading of anti-colonial nationalism was belied 
even before Partition, but it highlights how nation-formation in Asia is filtered through the 
colonial experience – whether direct or indirect – and cautions us against nationalist accounts 
which portray movements for liberation as creating coherent nations through struggle 
(Aloysius 1997: 214).  
 
Aloysius’ insightful critique of such historiography forces us to scrutinise such claims and 
emphasises that “the becoming of a nation and the setting up of a state system are two 
different things” (1997: 215). Indeed, the newly independent Asian countries were soon 
subject to question, and national unity appeared to be the delusion of nationalist protagonists 
who projected the image of a nation onto the post-colonial state. Chatterjee (1986, 1996) 
further punctures the mytho-history of ‘the midnight hour’ by noting that nationalist 
movements operated in accordance with a template derived from the colonial powers rather 
than indigenous models of community or government:   
 
The new political processes have, it would seem, managed to effect a 
displacement of the unifying force of dharma but have replaced it with the 
unifying concept of “nation” as concretely embodied in the state (Chatterjee 
1993: 198). 
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Chatterjee (1986) examines why the liberatory promises of nascent nation-states have so 
often been ephemeral. He suggests that rather than being opposites, nationalism and 
colonialism are meshed together by a value system that operates in the interests of middle 
class elites. As the tumult of independence fades, therefore, the ‘nation’ is revealed to be an 
illusion and authoritarian post-colonial states remain true to their ‘colonial inheritance’ 
(Aloysius 1997: 1). For some theorists, a corollary to this is: 
 
a lack of fit between the principles which have gone into the designing of these 
institutions over many long centuries in Europe, and those informal institutions 
to which we in India have traditionally been heir: family, caste, village 
(Saberwal 1986: 2).  
 
The consequence of this disjunction, Inden argues, “is a nation-state that remains 
ontologically and politically inaccessible to its own citizens” (1990: 197). The predicament 
confronting modernist nationalism is its inability to model the nation in its image. The flaw 
in such reasoning is its implicit acceptance of the nationalist myth that, for all its 
imperfections, the modern ‘nation’ exists. Such positions, Nigam (2006) shows, cast the 
alternate imaginings of subaltern classes as anti- or pre-modern. In fact, Nigam and Aloysius 
suggest, modern nationalists have not outpaced the ‘backward’ masses. Rather, the individual 
rationality of modernist nationalists is itself the real myth. Contesting the false 
modernity/tradition, nationalist/anti-nationalist dichotomies both authors point to the 
imbrication of the two. “Traditional dominance”, as Aloysius forcefully attests, “… formally 
transformed itself into state power without undergoing any substantial change” (1997: 227). 
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A burgeoning literature addresses the resultant dissonance between ‘the nation and its 
fragments’ (Chatterjee 1993). This discord was apparent even in 1947, when much of the 
population had no conception of what it meant to be ‘Indian’, stressing regional, linguistic or 
caste affiliations instead. Narayan’s (2005) research highlights enduring ambiguity about the 
nation in Dalit conceptions, and contends that the emergence of a Dalit press is facilitating 
the construction of alternate and resistant identities. Both Aloysius and Chatterjee confront 
this puzzle of why national-consciousness failed to emerge despite a mass-based nationalist 
movement. Both, ultimately, see nationalism as an elite project in which the ‘masses’ were 
‘manoeuvred’ (Chatterjee 1986: 85) rather than mobilised or ‘liberated by national-popular 
rule’ (Aloysius 1997: 218). The result was a ‘passive revolution’ (Chatterjee 1986: 30) and 
the ‘nation failed to emerge’ (Aloysius 1997: 217).  
 
Such analysis urges a critical scrutiny of nationalist narrations of history which silence 
subsidiary narratives (a point strikingly illustrated in Chatterjee’s (1996) omission of Muslim 
voices). In contradistinction to homogenising endeavours, Chatterjee (2001: 403) points to 
the submerged voices that contest the nation, and observes “that there is no available 
historical narrative of the nation that can resolve these contradictions”. Cognate analyses 
have bolstered the argument that non-Western nationalisms are merely (imperfect) copies of 
modular forms established elsewhere. Anxious to recover the agency of South Asians and 
escape uni-linear nationalist accounts, however, Chatterjee (1993: 5) famously takes issue 
with Anderson (1991). In asking ‘whose imagined community?’ he is primarily contesting 
the depiction of Asian nations as derivative, but his enquiry also confronts us with the 
question of who speaks for a community. From this perspective it is baffling that Chatterjee’s 
initial (1986, 1993) focus on the processes and manoeuvres by which one variant of 
nationalism triumphed, appears to take the Indian ‘nation’ as given.  
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Chatterjee (2001: 408) later developed his early insights to contest Anderson’s thesis that the 
nation exists in ‘homogenous empty time’ – the flat terrain of modernity and capital in which 
all nationals inhabit the same space of public and civil interaction -  and argues that even the 
same events are experienced differently by real people living in ‘heterogeneous time’. 
Aloysius (1997) more explicitly points to persistent inequalities as rendering India an 
example of ‘nationalism without a nation’. In this he echoes Ambedkar’s analysis that nation 
formation is frustrated by social stratification: “Philosophically it may be possible to consider 
a nation as a unit but sociologically it cannot but be regarded as consisting of many classes” 
(cited in Nigam 2006: 245). The moot point is whether arenas for public interaction and 
communication - upon which a nation is predicated - can exist in a country polarised by 
caste. Indian national consciousness has been haunted from its very conception by this 
conundrum with the effect that, despite its centrality to the imagining of India, caste is often 
obscured in analyses of the ‘nation’ (Nigam 2006: 225). It is to the conceptual confusions 
thrown up by this elision that we now turn. 
 
Nations in a Caste Context 
In Smith’s oft cited definition, a nation is: ‘A named human population which shares myths 
and memories, a mass public culture, a designated homeland, economic unity and equal 
rights and duties for all members’ (1995: 56-7). Notwithstanding the pessimism of the 
foregoing discussion, 60 years of a nationalising state have arguably created the conditions to 
classify India as nation so defined. Having inherited a socially divided polity, India has 
confronted the dialectical play between individuals and communities – most evident in the 
use of caste categories for affirmative action – in pursuit of ‘equal rights and duties’ and a 
‘public culture’. Smith’s account, however, lacks the crucial ingredient of ‘imagination’ or 
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self-definition. The importance of this is reinforced by Narayan’s (2005: 127) finding that 
“the mediation of print culture” is “constructing dalitness as identity” rather than fostering a 
sense of national communion. Such developments compel us to reiterate Ambedkar’s 
emphasis on the subjective aspects of nationhood: “Nationality is a social feeling. It is a 
feeling of corporate sentiment of oneness which makes those who are charged with it feel 
that they are kith and kin” (in Aloysius 1997: 153). 
 
The tension between nation and caste is immediately apparent. Ghurye (1932: 1-27) 
delineated six major features of the system: the segmental division of society, hierarchy, 
restrictions of feeding and social intercourse, civil and religious disabilities and privileges of 
the different sections, lack of choice of occupation, and restrictions on marriage. Caste 
operates at a group level and is based on hierarchy and separation. One may belong to only 
one caste and that caste is ranked vis-à-vis others. The division of society into discrete and 
hierarchically positioned groups militates against the formation of fellow feeling. 
Consequently, defining the ‘nation’ – already problematic in ‘multinational’ post-colonial 
states (Oommen 2006) – is further complicated where nationalist rhetoric founders on the 
rocks of caste. 
 
The complexities thrown up by this situation are transparent in Oommen’s commentary on 
‘nations and nationalism in South Asia’. In dissecting the national imaginings of Hindutva, 
Oommen notes how they either neglect the contributions to ‘Indian culture’ of Dravidians, 
Dalits and Tribals or relegate them to the sphere of ‘low culture’ (2006: 440). This insight, 
however, eludes his categorisation of linguistic groups as ‘nationalities’ and his assertion 
that: “South Asian states should be viewed as collectives of nations coexisting within federal 
states” (ibid. 443, original emphasis). This evasion of the conceptual quagmire removes the 
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question of national consciousness to the realm of political institutions. Given that “the 
dignified co-existence of a plurality of nations within a federal state is possible and even 
desirable” (ibid. 448, original emphasis), the debate turns to the means by which this can be 
best accomplished.  
 
Having shifted the parameters of inquiry, the mechanisms of democratic governance are 
frequently identified as the best guarantor of national cohesion. Banerjee’s work on elections 
encapsulates this trend. “Conducting elections in a fair and efficient way”, she avers, “helps 
generate not only faith in the democratic system, but also patriotic faith in the idea of India 
itself” (2007: 1560). Here, voting - as the minimum expression of citizenship – becomes the 
symbolic affirmation of nationality that confirms India as “indivisibly, both a new nation and 
a democracy” (ibid.). Ambedkar, Aloysius (1997: 154) notes, likewise defined “the ideal 
society or nation as democracy”, but he was all too aware that such a nation would have to be 
forged through struggle. That two scholars of such insight, imagination and commitment to 
social justice should offer such readings of the ‘nation’, thus, highlights the continuing 
lacuna regarding caste. 
 
Caste, Nation and Citizenship 
The absence of caste in discussions of the Indian ‘nation’ is especially surprising since, as 
one of the social institutions used to justify colonialism as a civilising mission, it was an 
inescapable nationalist topic. Arguments about the rule of colonial difference [‘we’ are better 
than ‘them’], and hence about the inherent incapacity of Indian society to acquire the 
‘virtues’ of modernity and nationhood, converged upon this supposedly unique Indian 
institution and were assumed by modernist nationalists (Dirks 2001: 255). Nehru (1946), 
thus, viewed caste as responsible for India’s ‘degeneracy’ and Congress committed itself to 
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remove the ‘disabilities’ of untouchability. Hindu nationalists and critical traditionalists (such 
as Gandhi) likewise critiqued exiting inequalities and sought, respectively, a homogeneous 
nation of Hindus or a caste system purged of its iniquitous effects. For all their (significant) 
differences, both nationalist projects effectively articulate(d) an elitist vision of Indian-ness 
which required lower castes to assimilate into a higher caste norm as a pre-condition for 
national membership (cf. Nigam 2006: 222; Aloysius 1997: 216). 
 
Rather than celebrating the diversity of Indian culture, the habitually demeaned skills of Dalit 
artists, artisans and craftsmen were written out of the national picture. The Dalit Resource 
Centre (Madurai) maintains that identities, skills and crafts have been “systematically … 
destroyed by the Brahmanical hegemony to maintain the caste system”, and seeks to 
recapture and revalorise them (Larbeer & Alexandar 2000: xi). Similarly, Karunakaran, a 
Dalit activist and development worker, argued that social status was a prerequisite for 
political status. The implicit thrust of his argument was that too narrow a focus on political 
citizenship obscured the specificities of the Dalit situation: 
 
Parai [leather drum] drummers wear out their bodies and bones for kanji or kall 
[Old rice or liquor] but they should demand fees … Don’t break this culture, 
give it value! (Interview, January 1999). 
 
Time and again the imbalance in perceptions of Bharatanatyam dancers and folk artists was 
pointed to as indicative of the marginalisation of Dalits in national narratives. The value 
placed on brahminical skills and training reinforces the argument that the ‘Indian citizen’ had 
an upper caste hue. Consequently, “civil society in India [became] a deeply divided and 
hierarchically structured domain, exclusive of the lower castes” (Pai & Narayanan 2003: 
 11
275). Even reservations, intended to counter caste inequality, were based on a narrow 
analysis that flattened the socio-cultural aspects of untouchability into the political realm and 
neglected large swathes of Dalit activity.2  
 
Recognising the perils inherent in this hidden casteism, lower caste leaders rejected the 
nationalist elite and argued that colonial rule was preferable to Independence under the 
higher castes (Nigam 2006: 183). In the 1930s and 1940s, Ambedkar and the Untouchable 
movement undercut Congress’ claim to represent the entire ‘Hindu nation’ and rebuffed the 
Gandhian argument that Untouchables should subordinate their cause to the nation’s unity. In 
a coruscating attack, Ambedkar underlined the incompatibility between the imagined 
communities of caste and nation:  
 
The effect of caste on the ethics of the Hindus is simply deplorable. Caste has 
killed public spirit. Caste has destroyed the sense of public charity. Caste has 
made public opinion impossible. A Hindu’s public is his caste. His 
responsibility is only to his caste (1987: 48). 
 
This strand of Dalit opinion deplored the predominantly Brahmin, male and bourgeois basis 
of the nationalist struggle and questioned the possibility of freedom in such a project. 
Apprehensions about the new polity were captured in Ambedkar’s pithy question: “Tell me 
what share I am to have in the Swaraj” (in Omvedt 1994: 216). Ambedkar, Nigam (2006) 
indicates, thereby rejected the notion that freedom for the whole necessarily entailed freedom 
for each part. The well-being of Dalits, in other words, was posited to be separate from that 
of the putative ‘nation’: 
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“The nation does not exist”, as Ambedkar wrote in 1943, “it is to be created, 
and I think it will be admitted that the suppression of a distinct and separate 
community is not the method of creating a nation” (Prashad 1996: 558). 
 
Well before Independence, thus, the Untouchable movement posed searching questions as to 
‘whose imagined community’ the new India would reflect. In contradistinction to elite 
nationalist narratives, a range of thinkers envisaged scenarios in which subalterns could lead 
themselves and articulate viable alternatives that encompassed the social as well as the 
political dimensions of nation formation. In his insightful study, Nigam (2006) argues that 
Dalit critiques implicitly undermined Westernised discourses of modernity and challenged 
the institutions of secular nationalism with demands for collective entitlements. The 
optimistic portrayal of India as a democratic nation by virtue of individuals’ commitment to 
the duties of citizenship, in this light, obscures the necessity for reconstruction and only 
makes sense if the modernist promises of nationalist rhetoric are taken at face value. 
 
Detailed awareness of the contradictions between caste and democracy underpinned 
Ambedkar’s demand for separate electorates in which Dalits could vote for Dalit candidates 
who would represent their interests. Gandhi’s response was a ‘fast unto death’ which forced 
Ambedkar to accept the compromise (the Poona Pact) of a proportion of all general seats 
being reserved for Dalit candidates. The importance of these deliberations in the shaping of 
the ‘nation’ cannot be overstated, since “an historic opportunity in the lifetime of the nation 
for forging unity on the basis of equitable sharing of power with the new entrants to the 
political community was lost” (Aloysius 1997: 200). The implicit majoritarianism of 
Gandhi’s stance impeded Dalit demands for recognition. “Imperceptibly”, as Chatterjee 
(2001: 412) argues, “the homogeneity of India slides into the homogeneity of the Hindus”. 
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The resultant imbrication of caste and citizenship is unsustainable: Firstly because, “as an 
ideology of state-society relations, [caste] is in many ways the opposite of the concept of 
equality that India’s secular intellectuals consider to be the core value of the Indian state” 
(Mitra 1994: 52). Far from heralding Ambedkar’s ideal society, caste became integral to 
electoral competition; secondly – since Dalits do not form a majority in any constituency – 
Dalit candidates and parties are forced to make ‘compromises with Manuvadi’ (Pai 2003: 1). 
Thirdly, this entails that ‘non-Dalits decide which Dalits will win’ (Larbeer 1999: 8). The 
upshot of this threefold logic has been a form of ‘political sanskritisation’ in which Dalit 
parties and candidates have canvassed majority opinion rather than articulating alternatives. 
Even the most successful Dalit political party – the Bahujan Samaj Party – ‘works within the 
system’ and forges pragmatic alliances which help secure power whilst diluting its 
transformative agenda (Pai 2003: 10). As Omvedt insists, this contradicts the radical Dalit 
and non-Brahmin visions of an egalitarian nation free of caste: 
 
The Phule/Ambedkar/Periyar tradition represents the effort to construct an 
alternative identity of the people, based on non-north Indian and low-caste 
perspectives (1994: 244).3 
 
Instead, Omvedt, Nigam and Aloysius argue, India emerged as an elitist democracy in which 
socio-political power was concentrated in the hands of upper caste interests. We must, 
however, pause here and recollect India’s status as the world’s largest democracy. Banerjee’s 
(2007) paper admirably charts the commitment with which people from all social 
backgrounds religiously participate in elections, and notes how voter turn-out has gradually 
increased. Have 60 years under the auspices of a nationalising state committed (in principle 
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at least) to social justice, not mitigated the situation described above? Is there no truth in the 
projection of the political institutions of Indian democracy as the basis of the ‘nation’? 
 
Modernist assumptions and Dalit mobilisation cemented community identities into the 
constitutional framework of the Republic. Discrimination on the basis of caste became a 
punishable offence even as reservations allocated resources on that basis. Affirmative action 
- initiated as a stop-gap - has been reinforced and extended to more castes in the pursuit of 
social equity. Would we not be justified, from this perspective, from following Tonnesson 
(2004: 181) in regarding India as a ‘national-state’? This formulation is attractive and 
foregrounds the centrality of the state to the process of nation-formation. I contend, however, 
that it entails the conflation of state and ‘nation’ by mistaking political intent for actual 
practice. To capture the degree to which an Indian national identity has crystallised 
(Mukherji 1998), we must chart the degree to which a ‘sentiment of oneness’ has emerged. 
To this end we turn now to the empirical data.  
 
Methodological Anti-Nationalism? 
Data was collected in Tamilnadu between 1998-9 during a multi-sited ethnography of Dalit 
movements focussing on motivations, modes of operation, and ideological aspirations. The 
data consisted of 30 group discussions and 60 interviews (32 formal and 30 informal) with 
activists, leaders, academics and non-participating Dalits. Interviews were complemented 
with participant observation and analysis of speeches.4 My childhood in Tamilnadu (from the 
age of 4 till 11), prior contacts and fluent conversational Tamil facilitated exchanges that 
probed beyond the surface details. My background aided access and explained my interest, 
but though my research aims were explained from the outset I was variously regarded as a 
human rights observer, a social worker, and a government official.  
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Irrespective of how I was seen, there was a pervasive desire to ‘send a message to the world’ 
and a determination to voice deprivations, demands and dreams. The movements in question 
mobilised around issues of citizenship, rights and social equality, which poses a 
methodological issue: To what extent can a critique of the ‘nation’ be based on the testimony 
of its most trenchant critics? Activists may distort or exaggerate reality to make a point. A 
strategic response to this problematic is to view the data as a discursive counter-narrative to 
the ‘nation’, but the question of how widespread such views are remains. Whilst drawing on 
a range of respondents, therefore, I focus on two group discussions with Dalit villagers who 
were only peripherally involved in movement activism.5 Their views do not constitute a 
representative survey, but they offer an insight into the perceptions and prescriptions of 
Tamil Dalits. 
 
Untouchable Citizens? 
Contrary to Banerjee’s (2007) sanguine account, Dalits in the villages of Vadianpatti and 
Kodankipatti (central Tamilnadu) had a less benign reading of the post-colonial state, and 
lacked a patriotic sense of Indian-ness. At the time of the interviews Dalits in both villages 
were subject to a social boycott, the former for ‘presuming’ to express an allegiance to the 
Dalit Panther Movement (DPI – the largest and most active Tamil Dalit movement), and the 
latter for refusing to perform ‘caste duties’. These, as Balasubramaniam (an insurance clerk 
and the most politically active of the villagers) explained, are incompatible with citizenship: 
 
It is serf labour – if someone dies we have to tell the village about it, also the 
undertaking work has to be done by us. This work on the body and carrying the 
body to the cremation grounds is reserved for untouchables (Group 2). 
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The boycott meant that Dalits were not employed locally, were debarred from the public 
spaces of the village - such as the bus-stop - and denied the services of the local barber. 
Kodankipatti Dalits had shunned these demeaning tasks since 1990 which soured relations to 
the point that they were violently hounded out. They were pelted with stones, beaten with 
sticks and had their houses ransacked. In an episode that fractured the fragile sense of 
national-unity, they became refugees in their own land. Arulmozhi, an articulate mother of 
three, recalled the incident: 
 
“Run you (‘Wodu dee’: Dee is the impolite, vulgar form of ‘you’)”, they 
[dominant castes] said and spilt all our rice … “What! Do you think there is room 
in this village for you? … This is our place and we will rule it. We won’t keep 
downtrodden people here – you should remain subservient if you stay here” 
(Group 2). 
 
Peace committees and government intervention saw the Dalits re-housed, but tensions 
resurfaced in 1999. A few months after my interview the Dalits were again displaced and 
their homes were smashed and burned. The cause of the renewed violence was the increasing 
autonomy of Dalit villagers. Though they were denied work locally, a bus route into the city 
offered them alternate employment and access to the liberatory rhetoric of Dalit movements. 
Like Narayan (2005), I encountered Dalits who had reinterpreted their lives through the 
prism of movement information. Whilst this fits the narrative of a democratising national 
society, it is one thing to construct a new sense of self it is another to make it stick. When 
Dalits staked a claim to ‘common land’ and screened a film in the village square, they 
transgressed the bounds of caste tolerance. Laxmanan, a forester and educated Dalit with no 
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political affiliation insisted that the problems stemmed from a fundamental disparity in social 
positions and perceptions: 
 
None of the castes here have a notion of justice or whatever. The reason for this 
is that they are higher caste – they do not even feel that we are part of the same 
India (Interview: March 1999).  
  
Balasubramaniam concurred, and illustrated the dissonance between state policy and caste 
practice: 
 
If I came back to this village as a DSP [Deputy Superintendent of Police] - 
untouchable that I am – I could not go into the temple or drink tea in the village 
shop. I might be a DSP, but I’m born and bred in this village am I not, and so I 
cannot be accepted or revered here … We can’t partake in the Republic Day or 
Independence Day ceremonies, then this Independence for India has yet to be 
granted to the untouchables (Interview: March 1999). 
 
One of the most popular rhetorical tropes employed by disaffected respondents was to hark 
back to the nationalist struggle and offer an alternate analysis. Chandran, an agricultural 
labourer from Vadianpatti – inspired by but unattached to the DPI – was typical in this 
regard: 
 
Still we are suppressed! We haven’t been liberated or received our 
independence yet. However high we rise, when we go there [to the main village] 
we are slaves. Under British rule all of us were suppressed, then it didn’t seem 
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so bad. … Saying we’re going to win independence and protesting and winning 
independence – they haven’t given us any freedom. He [Gandhi] got everyone 
independence but didn’t give any to us. It is 50 years since Independence, but 
we still don’t know what it means (Group 1).  
 
Arulmozhi from Kodankipatti echoed this sentiment: 
 
They say we got independence in 1947 from you – from the white people, but 
they [dominant castes] are the only ones who gained independence and they 
seek to suppress us just as much as your lot did (Group 2). 
 
Their disillusionment with nationalist promises derives from bitter experience, and both 
groups pointed to the continuing practice of untouchability in the form of separate glasses at 
the tea-shop, unequal access to ‘common resources’ and a skewed agricultural resource base 
in which ‘dominant castes’ owned or controlled the productive land.6  
 
I was recurrently confronted by statements that disputed the unity of India. Nor was this 
critique confined to disaffected villagers or radical militants. Palinivelu Swamy, the SC/ST 
secretary of the Bharatiya Janata Party (a Hindu nationalist party) in Tamilnadu, may have 
had a different prescription, but his diagnosis was the same: 
 
“Hindusthan for the Hindus, get rid of the white people” – that was their demand. 
All [nationalist] leaders did not seek independence for a single class or caste, but 
for the whole of India. But having fought so hard, with great difficulty and 
 19
bloodshed – often going hungry - to gain the paradise of freedom, after 
independence there has been an excess of untouchability (Interview: April 1999).  
 
National optimists would point to the creation of spaces for the articulation of discontent and 
the Dalits’ decreasing dependency – as evinced in their resistance. References to state 
policies support this: “Our only buttress”, as Balasubramaniam averred, “is the reservation 
policy given to us by Ambedkar” (Interview, March 1999). Village Dalits, however, 
frequently punctured such analysis and unwittingly echoed Ambedkar’s assertion that “caste 
has killed public spirit” by revealing the absence of a meaningful public sphere and 
enumerating the manifold ways in which caste continues to inform the daily patterns of 
village life. Laxmanan pointed to inequalities enacted in ritual fashion: 
 
When the common God is worshipped or carried on a bier we cannot even go 
near. We have to stand ten feet away from its path. If we want to give a garland or 
an offering to the idol then we have to give it to a caste Hindu to do so. Even the 
God does not accept us according to this procedure (Interview: March 1999). 
 
Village women listed the daily indignities and obstacles they faced in the use of common 
lands and water sources (Group 2). “Even in cremation grounds”, Balasubramaniam 
concluded, “we have a separate cremation ground to theirs; that’s how divided we are!” 
(Group 2). These perceptions were confirmed by interviews with local Backward Caste 
individuals, who admitted that Dalits were marginalised. They blamed ‘inferiority 
complexes’, but my Dalit respondents ridiculed such suggestions (Gorringe 2005: 185-7). 
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The idea of India, thus, surfaces most strongly as an absent presence or betrayed promise. 
The abandoned commitments and continuing atrocities that prompted Ambedkar to threaten 
to burn the constitution which he had drafted, are a recurrent theme. The failure of effective 
and meaningful land-reform programmes are seen to indicate the caste nature of the Indian 
polity: 
 
Generally when politicians come up they take untouchability issues to heart. 
Periyar’s doctrines and so on they take on board. If a film tackles social problems, 
they sit in the theatre and applaud the revolutionary utterances and praise the 
doctrines. But when it comes to practice those higher up in the caste hierarchy lag 
behind (Laxmanan Interview: March 1999). 
 
Chandra Bose, leader of the Martyr Immanuel’s Front (TIP – a mainly Pallar organisation), 
placed this discontent in a wider frame, pointing to the implicit biases of the constitution:  
 
The laws for the ‘Protection of India’ are actually for the benefit of five 
interests. Who are they? Hindutva, then caste society in India, then after that the 
existing high castes, then after that big landlords, and finally the big capitalists. 
Without disturbing these five, without affecting the well-being of these five, we 
cannot do anything! (Interview: February 1999). 
 
Village Dalits bemoan the inaction of state authorities and their disillusionment is amplified 
by movement activists who lament the abdication of government responsibility.  
Thirumavalavan, the DPI leader, railed against government passivity in the face of repeated 
warnings about trouble in Kodankipatti and described persistent inaction as connivance:  
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If, once, they shot someone setting fire to a cottage would others set fire to one 
thereafter? If you once tied up and shot someone who had attacked and murdered 
a Dalit would he be able to kill again? But they are not prepared to take these 
steps. You do not have to go that far. Do you not, at least, want to arrest them? 
(Speech: June 1999).  
 
There is one law for ‘them’, was a common phrase, and another for ‘us’. Such accusations 
acquire added poignancy with the claim to indigenous status. In adapting colonial theories 
about the conquest of Dravidians by Aryans, Dalit movements portray themselves as thrice 
bereft; of their culture, their land and their rights: 
 
Is India a Hindu nation? Whose country is it? Who are the ancestors of this 
land, who are the children of this earth? Who are the sons of the soil? Who are 
the kin of this land? We are! (Thirumavalavan Speech: July 1999).  
 
Such accounts constitute an attempt to imagine a counter-culture in which the marginality of 
cheris (Dalit settlements outside the main village, or in the poorest areas of cities) becomes a 
potent symbol of a community that withstands ostracism to continuously confront the nation 
with its internal ‘Other’: 
 
You can fight and beat Pakistan, you can overcome China, but you cannot 
suppress the cheri people of this land any more (Cinthanai Selvam, DPI 
Assistant General Secretary. Speech: June 1999). 
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As Chellamma from Kodankipatti expressed it; “They think that we should be slaves to them, 
but that we can never do!” (Group 2). Persistent atrocities against Dalits, vacancies in 
reserved jobs, and the abiding sense of disenfranchisement occasioned by electoral violence 
and compromised Dalit politicians have fuelled more radical demands. Some are no longer 
prepared to knock on the national door for admittance. F. Mathew, an activist and teacher in 
a Christian school, for example, sees little hope for integration: 
 
Such opportunities as there are, are stolen one by one. We need a separate 
Dalitstan, Dalit government, Dalit economics and Dalit justice – only then 
would Dalit liberation be possible (Interview: January 1999). 
 
Such ideas are not new, as Prashad notes; in the run up to Independence, “some Dalits 
demanded a nation of achhuts (Untouchables) alongside Pakistan called Achhutistan” (2000: 
150-1).7 Given the problems of assimilation presented by caste barriers, the call for 
secessionism is appealing. The fissiparous state of Dalits, however, renders such a 
community impracticable (even if internal differences were overcome). Dalit separatism, 
Prashad (2000: 152) astutely notes, has never been absolute and has functioned as an 
incendiary assertion of persistent inequality that accompanies calls for reservations and other 
means of alleviating the position of Dalits – a radical reminder of the still unfinished project 
of nation-formation. In its more nuanced forms, this demand is conjoined with an appeal for 
more localised participation and access to power. S. Martine, a child-labourer who became an 
advocate and development worker in Tindivanam, articulated such a vision: 
 
Dalit politics … can be captured in the mnemonic ‘LAMP’: Leninism – the 
abolition of colonial rule and recognition of national ethnic groups. 
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Ambedkarism – the abolition of caste. Marxism – economic equality; and 
Periyarism – the abolition of Brahmin domination and the achievement of 
sexual equality. …  
We originally started out with MAP, but felt that Leninism added something 
essential. Language based ethnic groups are dominant and so regional politics 
prevail – soon central rule will be impossible. “We don’t want to collaborate 
with the centre [Delhi]”, and “More power to the state [the regional power 
centres]” have been the slogans, which chime with the very important Dalit and 
local demand for the right to self-determination (Interview: January 1999). 
 
Language-based ethnicity is hard to escape in Tamilnadu, where Tamil nationalist parties 
have dominated state politics since 1967. Indeed, the powerful sentiments unleashed by the 
interlinking issues of language, region and soil have meant that Dalit movements are often 
embroiled in sub-nationalist movements. The DPI, thus, confines its aspirations to the state: 
 
We will eradicate caste and religion and create an equal society. We will break 
the social structure and eradicate poverty. Using the nationally given rights for 
ethnicities we will nurture a Tamil nation (a nation of Tamils undivided by 
caste) (Thirumavalavan, Speech: July 1999). 
 
Whilst this offers the prospect of cross-caste coalitions along linguistic lines, it detracts from 
the pan-Indian possibilities for protest opened up by the term ‘Dalit’. Furthermore, whilst 
Thirumavalavan and Martine are not blind to caste dominance within the linguistic ‘nation’, 
they espouse an idealistic (and naïve) belief in the unity of ‘minorities, small farmers and 
labourers’ that is belied in the villages above. The Dalit activist critique, in other words, 
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remains wedded to the nation concept. In seeking to critique the elite basis of nationalism, 
however, Martine and others evoke a community that is more imaginary than that of the 
Indian state. Their position echoes Ilaiah’s argument that “India has always been divided into 
two cultures and two civilisations: the Dalitbahujan [Dalit popular] and the brahminical” 
(2002: 127).  
 
There is some credence for this argument given that lower castes worship different Gods, 
practice more plebeian (and less valued) folk arts and crafts and offer(ed) a bride-price rather 
than demanding a dowry. What neither position addresses sufficiently, however, is how 
fiercely protective of their status the intermediate castes are. When Kamaraj, a DPI activist, 
and others, state that “we are seen as aliens in our own land” (Interview, March 1999), they 
are referring primarily to the endemic caste clashes between Backward Castes and Dalits.8 As 
Dalits have organised, the quotes above illustrate and Pandian (2000: 501) notes, Backward 
Caste groups have become increasingly violent to retain authority. The political mobilisation 
of caste communities has led to increased polarisation and a series of violent incidents which 
shatter the faith vested in Banerjee’s (2007) “sacred elections”. Two prominent examples are 
the Melavalavu massacre and the violence surrounding the DPIs decision to contest the 1999 
Lok Sabha elections (Gorringe 2005). In Melavalavu (central Tamilnadu), when the local 
panchayat was reserved, BCs threatened violence, disrupted elections and then, when a 
president was elected, exacted a terrible price on the Dalit functionaries: 
 
In this country we do not have the rule of law, we only have the rule of caste … 
What they say is: ‘When I told you not to stand [for election] why did you ignore 
that? You stood, that is why I butchered you. In this country – this village – you 
should listen to what we say. You can be a big man wherever you want otherwise’ 
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– this message was relayed even to officials. … Murugesan [Panchayat president] 
and six others were attacked and killed. Murugesan especially was hacked to 
death and his head was thrown into a nearby well (Saktivel Interview: March 
1999). 
 
Facing such atrocities the DPI boycotted elections for a decade spoiling their ballots with 
messages such as: “Why do we, without the right to live, only have the right to vote?” The 
violence in Thirumavalavan’s constituency in 1999, after the abandonment of the poll 
boycott, did little to enhance their faith in the Republic:  
 
We do not even have the right to vote in this country. They say it’s a people’s 
government/country – a democracy, a nation of high culture and custom. The 
downtrodden don’t even have the right to choose the representative whom they 
want in this land. How can we remain patient? (Saktivel Speech: September 
1999).  
 
Continuing political and social exclusion means that Dalits cannot square the competing 
communities of caste and nation, and there are recurrent demands for separate electorates. In 
protests, speeches and interviews they persistently shattered the image of India as a coherent 
nation. “Recently”, as Balasubramaniam exclaimed, “even blacks in South Africa have won 
their rights and their liberation, but we are denied our basic rights” (Interview: March 1999). 
 
Discussion 
We return then to where we started and the nagging dissonance between caste, nation and 
state. This disjuncture was crystallized when the political survival of the nascent state was 
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premised on a series of alliances with pre-capitalist structures which precluded the possibility 
of meaningful social change (Aloysius 1997: 216). The attempt to construct the newly 
independent Republic as a bastion of egalitarian, democratic practice portrayed caste as a 
‘traditional relic’ with a discredited past and a limited future. Nigam (2006) demonstrates 
how historians have adopted this modernist nationalist portrayal of caste and, as witnessed 
above, the silencing of caste also permeates social scientific analysis. Incredibly, a recent 
book by a collection of high profile academics (Sen 2003) can speak of ‘India’s national 
culture’ with barely a mention of caste. Various visionaries, from Gandhi to Azad, are 
excerpted but there is no room for the insights of Phule, Periyar or Ambedkar. Ambedkar is 
cited … but only by reference to the imposition of Hindi as a national language. Where caste 
is mentioned it is with embarrassment that it has yet to disappear in a secular and modern 
India (Vatsyayan 2003: 104). 
 
This blindness in relation to caste enables scholars to speak of a national identity united 
around the common ‘languages’ of cricket, cuisine and Bombay films (Sen 2003, Chandhoke 
2003: 94, Banerjee 2007: 1560). Ignoring the northern bias in the choice of Bollywood (and 
the problematic relationship between caste, class and cinema), the notion that cricket and 
cuisine remain untainted by the vagaries of caste, class and region beggars belief.9 Writing 
against the grain of such studies, and following the lead of Aloysius, Nigam and Chatterjee, 
this paper has questioned whether India is a national-state and interrogated the extent to 
which previously ostracised groups have been integrated. It has sought, in Nigam’s (2006: 
177) terms, to “explore precisely what is left unexplored when we begin with the a priori 
assumption of nation in existence”. 
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So long as the state-nation avoids the painful issues and political decisions that could 
reconstitute social relations (eg. land-reforms) it will remain in an unhappy limbo – denied 
the ‘fundamental legitimacy’ that is accorded by the alignment of state and nation. The 
successive challenges to the state-nation from linguistic, regional, religious, ethnic and caste 
groups result from the incongruity between the imagined community of the state and 
everyday reality. A “sense of common nationhood”, as Connor rightly argues, “is not 
compatible with a cross-cutting class cleavage as deep and unremitting as that between slave 
and landowner” (1994: 157). Untouchability, it is clear, is irreconcilable with nationhood and 
undermines the democratic project.  
 
Whilst Dalits continue to be marginalised India must abandon pretensions to nationhood. In 
rejecting secessionist demands or radical disengagement, however, Dalit movements have 
reinvigorated the question of nation-formation and entwined it with democratic reform: 
“Only when [constitutional] rights reach the lowest person”, Jeyanthi Natarajan, a prominent 
Women’s and Dalit rights campaigner, insists, “can we call this a democracy!” (Speech: 
November 1999). 60 years after Independence, my respondents testify to the current 
significance of ‘The Untouchable Question’, and the tension between “the ‘political’ and the 
‘social’” (Prashad 1996: 551). They bear witness to continuing untouchability and the 
realisation that some Indians regard others as less ‘Indian’ than themselves, which was never 
more apparent than in the differential treatment reportedly meted out to tsunami victims. 
 
Given the prevalence of anti-Dalit discrimination some activists remain wedded to 
separatism. Krishnabaraiyanar of the Ambedkar Revolutionary Movement (a marginal, 
militant outfit), for instance, demanded: ‘Separate Land! A separate Dalit land! Let us raise 
the slogan and a thousand of us go to jail. We will declare autonomy’ (Speech: December 
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1999). At first sight Dhanalakshmi, the sister of a DPI activist who resented the drain on 
family resources that his activism entailed, seems to concur: ‘The day will come’, she 
insisted, ‘and not in the distant future, but soon, when we will gain our independence; Our 
Independence Day, our freedom day!’ (Informal Interview: July 1999). The similarities 
between the two sentiments are deceptive, however, as Dhanam’s vision was not an 
autonomous Dalit state, but the more pragmatic desire for a share of political power, and a 
greater degree of social equality. The ‘nation’ envisaged here is a plural and civic entity that 
mirrors Ambedkar’s conceptualisation and echoes Connor’s analysis: 
 
If a society describes itself as a democracy, then the refusal to permit large 
sections of the populace to participate in the political process may be viewed as 
tantamount to declaring that those who are disenfranchised are not members of 
the nation (1994: 158). 
 
The demand, thus, is for the democratisation of Indian democracy, which requires an 
understanding of citizenship and national identity as differentiated by caste. It is here that 
Dalit movements diverge most clearly from the projects of Backward and Other Backward 
Castes and Classes. Whilst some Dalits fall prey to the politics of identity, the radical 
potential of Dalit mobilisation is the implicit advocacy of a politics of redistribution that 
would grant everybody, rather than specific groups and elites, a stake in the nation. Concrete 
steps to this end would include: ensuring that ballot boxes are not located in areas of single-
caste dominance; minimising the dependency of rural Dalits on other castes for employment, 
water and land; recruiting a police force that does not reflect the caste composition of the 
locality. Achieving such alterations will be neither easy nor, necessarily, popular, but if the 
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contested politico-cultural terrain that is India is to crystallise into a national state, then more 
effort is needed to integrate the margins.  
 
Conclusion 
The nation needs to be ‘imagined’, but it is clear that imagination alone is an insufficient 
coagulant: the Dalit activists’ veneration of Ambedkar and repeated appeals for the 
implementation of the constitution bear witness to the latent sense of community offered by 
the ‘idea of India’. Repeated failures by state authorities to enforce land-reforms, reservations 
or prosecutions, however, reveal how insular the imagined community of elites remains. As 
Aloysius concludes:  
 
Nationalism does not mechanically engender the nation. In the absence of actual 
change within society, in our case the destruction of the Brahminic social order, 
nationalism’s relation to the masses remains ambiguous at best. Here the process 
of invention is displaced by one of prevention (1997: 225).  
 
Speaking at a demonstration to condemn poll violence, Puthiya Tamizhagam’s (New 
Tamilnadu – 2nd largest Dalit movement in the state) Madurai representative Alexander 
captured the nationalist elite’s circumvention of difficult questions: 
 
In 1922 Gandhi declared for a national parliament. Father Periyar asked Gandhi: 
‘Will the independence we receive be caste freedom, communalist freedom, 
ethnic freedom or nationalist freedom?’ ‘Why ask?’ Gandhi retorted. At that time, 
he said, none knew what independence would mean and he grew angry and told 
Periyar: ‘First let the hen lay the egg, then we can decide whether to make a fried 
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egg, omelette or boil it’. Then Father Periyar asked: ‘Gandhiji, it is not my wish to 
deny us getting independence – it is not my aim to prevent the hen from laying the 
egg. But eggs which are forced out may be rotten and what should we do then? 
(Speech: September 1999). 
 
Nationalist narratives, as Guru (1998: 157) notes, remained deliberately vague on the subject 
of power and resources. Dalit leaders, therefore, drew on alternate narratives and 
vocabularies to voice a cogent critique of the nascent ‘nation’. In engaging with socio-
political opponents and confounding cultural codes, Dalit protest has placed the caste of the 
‘nation’ at the centre of contemporary debates. In so doing they have opened up new spheres 
of civic engagement and rekindled the opportunities to imagine India that were bypassed by 
the nationalist struggle. The ‘nation’, ‘Tada’ Periyasami (Assistant General Secretary of the 
DPI) insisted, faces two options:  
 
The Gandhian way [which] does not change society but advocates adjustment – 
all living as harmonious castes. The other way is that of struggle and revolution – 
which seeks to create a new society not maintain the old one (Interview: 
November 1999).  
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suggestions. Needless to say all faults reflect my own incompetence. 
1 Untouchables are officially known as Scheduled Castes (SCs) referring to the castes on a list (Schedule) of 
communities deemed to require affirmative action. STs are Scheduled Tribes. 
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2 Significantly the Mandal commission called for suitable institutional, financial and technical assistance for 
members of traditional vocational communities like potters who wanted to set up small scale industries of their 
own. Such schemes would integrate ‘caste work’ into the national pantheon. 
3 Jyotirao Phule was a Maharashtrian ideologue and social reformer who campaigned for women’s and Dalits’ 
rights (Zelliot 1996: 37-45). EVR or Periyar (great one) was a Tamil nationalist who articulated an ideal of a 
socialist, caste-free and egalitarian society (See Pandian 1995).  
4 ‘Formal’ interviews were pre-arranged and tape-recorded. Informal ones were spontaneous and involved more 
dialogue. Where appropriate I have used pseudonyms and altered locations. 
5 Group 1, in Vadianpatti, assembled in a shrine-like building dedicated to the DPI. The local leader, however, 
was absent and the group was critical of the movement. The group consisted of five men, all agricultural 
labourers or ‘coolie’ workers in Madurai. Group 2, in Kodankipatti, consisted of five women and two men 
(Balasubramaniam and Laxmanan were also interviewed separately) and took place in an empty house. None of 
the women worked since local agricultural opportunities were denied to them. The discussions were dominated 
by some respondents but everyone contributed. Both discussions occurred in March 1999. 
6 These broad caste categories are misleading as they do not map onto homogenous blocks. Vulnerable Dalits, 
however, lumped the upper castes together in the term ‘dominant castes’ (Aadhikar Jaadi) - See Gorringe 
(2005: 122-4). Ambedkar similarly notes: Whilst ‘this division of touchables against untouchables may require 
explanation, the division so far as modern India is concerned is real and substantial’ (1989: 192). 
7 This demand finds an interesting parallel in Gellner’s (1983: 106) observation that pariah minorities often face 
persecution in the new states. He outlines two solutions: assimilation or the forging of a distinct nation (such as 
Israel). Where neither option is available, he remarks, ‘the plight of the blues [read Dalits] is serious indeed’ 
(1983: 69). 
8 Tamil society is (crudely) stratified into three main caste clusters: Brahmins, Backward and Scheduled Castes. 
The Varna categories of Kshatriya and Vaishya are largely absent here. Backward Castes (BC) - whilst 
touchable - also suffered caste discrimination and receive reservations. Politically speaking, the phrase is a 
misnomer since BCs dominate Tamil politics and society.  
9 See Anand (2007) and other contributors to the Himal Southasian 20(7) edition on sport in South Asia. 
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